Abstract. Consider the following scenario: Alice and Rob, two parties who share n o secret key init,ially b u t whose goal it is t o generat.e a (large amount of) information-theoret,ically secure (or uncoritlitionally secure) shared secret key. are connected only by an insecure public channel t o which an eavesdropper Eve has perfect (read) access. Moreover, there exists a satelite hroadcasting random bits at a very low signal power. Alice ant1 Rob can receive these bits with cert.ain bit error probabilities c~ and 6 8 , respect.iveIy (e.g. = F B = 302,) while Eve is assumed to receive the s a m e bits much more reliably with bit error probability E E << C A , En (e.g. C E = 1%). T h e errors on the t,liree channels a r e assumed t.0 occur at least part,ially independently. Practical protocols arc tliscu~scd 1)). w1iic.h Alice and Bob can generate a secret key clespitc t h e facts t h a t PI-e pnsscsses more information than both of t.licm and Is assiimwl to have nnlimiictl compiitat,iorial resources as well as complete knou-ledge of the protocols.
Introduction
One of the fundamental problems in cryptography is the t,ransmission of a message M from a sender (referred t o as Alice) to a receiver (Rob) over an insecure communication channel such that an enemy (Eve) with access to this channel is unable to obtain useful information about M .
In the classical model of a cryptosystem introduced by Shannon [9] , Eve has perfect access to the insecure channel; thus she is assumed t o receive an identical copy of the ciphertext C received by the legitimate receiver Bob, where C is obtained as a function of the plaintext message M and a secret key I( shared by Alice and Bob. Shannon defined a cipher system t o be perfect if the ciphertext is statistically independent of the plaintext or, in information-theoretic terms, if the ciphertext gives no information about the plaintext:
When a perfect cipher is used to encrypt. a message ,If, a.n cnprny can do no better than guess 111 without. evm looking at the ciphertext C.
It is assumed that the reader is faitiiliar w i t h the fundamental^ of information theory, in particular with the ent,ropy H ( X ) of a random variable .Y. the conditional entropy of S given Y , H(SIY), and the mutual information h c t w e n S
and Y defined as I ( S ; Y ) = H ( > Y ) -H(2Yll'
). TVe refer to [4] for a n introduction t o information theory.
Shannon gave as a simple example of a perfect cipher the well-known onetime pad which is completely impractical for most applications where only a short secret key is available. Shannon proved the pessimistic result that. pezfect secrecy can be achieved only when the secret key is at least as long as the plaintext message or, more precisely, when Almost all presently-used ciphers are based on Shannon's model but have only a short secret key: they can therefore theoretically be broken. for instance by an exhaustive key search. The goal of designing surh a practical cipher is to guarantee that t,here exists no efficient; algorithm for breaking it, for a reasonable definition of breaking. However. for no existing cipher can the computational security be proved without invoking an unproven intractability hypothesis.
Perfect secrecy on the other hand is often prejudged as being impractical because of Shannon's pessimistic inequality (1). It, is one of the goals of this paper to relativize this pessimism by pointing out that Shannon's apparently innocent assumption that, except for the secret key, the enemy h a s access to precisely the same information as the legitimate receiver, is much more restrictive than has generally been realized.
The key to perfect secrecy without a shared secret key K satisfying (1) is to modify Shannon's model such that the enemy ca.nnot r (albejt almost) t.he same information as t.he legit,imat,e receiver. Two previous approaches based on this idea are quantum cryptography introduced by Wiesner and put forward by Bennett, Brassard e t nl. [I] , and hfaurer's randomized cipher [7] which makes use of a public random string that is too long to be read entirely in feasible time. Both these approaches are impractical at present I Another approa.ch is due to Wyner [ll] and subsequently Csiszh and Korner [5] who considered a scenario in which the enemy Eve is assumed to receive messages transmitted by the sender Alice over a channel that is noisier than the legitimate receiver Bob's channel. The assumption that, Eve's channel is worse than the main channel is unrealistic in general. The results of this paper demonstrate that this unrealistic assumption is unnecessary if Alice and Bob can also communicate over a completely inseciire public channel.
In this paper, the hroaclcast, channel scenario is generalized to a scenario where Alice, Rob and Eve know random variables X , Y and Z . respectively, jointly d k r i b u t e d according to some probability distribution F'A-~Fz, ant1 where Alice and Bob can also communicate over a public channel.
Xote t h a t the need for a piihlic channel entails no significant loss of practicality in a cryptographic context because the channel need not provide secrecy.
It is assumed, however. t,hat all messages sent over the public clixnnel can be received by Eve without error, but that she cannot modify messages or introduce frai~dulent~ messages without being detected. If this last assumption cannot realistically be made, authenticity and dat,a integrit,y can be ensured by using an unconditionally secure aut,hentication scheme. for instance that of [lo] based on universal hashing, which requires that Alice and Bob share a short, secret, key initially. In this case, the purpose of our protocols is t,o stretch (rather than to generate) a secret key unconditionally securely. Part of the generated key can be used for authent.ication in a subsequent instance of t,he prot,ocol.
The use of a public channel by two parties for extract,ing a secret key from an initially shared partially secret string was previously considtxred hy LeungYan-Cheong [6] and independent,ly by Bennett, Brassard and Robert. [3] . XU unconditionally secure shared secret key genemted by one of our protocols can be used as the key sequence in the onetime pad, thus achieving (virtually) perfect secrecy of the transmitted messages. This paper is concerned with key dist,ribution as well as encrypt,ion.
Secret Key Agreement by Public Discussion
Consider the following general key agreement problem. Assume that Alice.
Bob and Eve know random variables .Y, Y and 2, respectively, wit ti joint prohability distribution P x y z , and that Eve has no information about S and I; other than through her knowledge of Z . More precisely, I ( S Y ; TjZ) = 0 where T summarizes Eve's complet,e iriformation about, the universe. ,Y, I' a n d 2 take on values in some f i n i k alphahets .Y, y and -7, respectively. Alice antl Rob share no secret key initially (other t h a n possibly a short key required for giiarantering authenticity and integrity of messages sent over the public channel), buT are assumed to know P x y z . In particular, the protocol and the codes used by and Bob sends messages a t even steps IC3, C.l,. . .). Aforeover. we can restrict the analysis to deterministic protocols since a possihlr randomizm-w l i i c l i Alice's and/or Rob's strxt.egy antl messages mi:lit dr3pentl on c a n be considt>rbd as part of X and I -. respectively. J n other norlls, :\lice ancl no11 can rvitiiout low of generali1,y extenll their known ando om ixrinl~lc~s S a n d 1'. rrSpecti:.ely. !,'!. random bits that are st,atistic*ally iildcpcndcnt of >Y, 1' and Z. ; I t tlic. 
I ( S ; C t Z ) 5 6
for some specified (small) 6 
where IS/ denotes the number of distinct values that S takes on w i t h non-zero probabilit,y. Not,e that H(S1S') -+ 0 as E -+ 0.
If one requires that P[S # S'] = 0 and I(S;Ct) = 0 (i.e., that c = 0 in (6) and 6 = 0 in (7) ) it appears obvious that I ( S ; 1') is an upper bound on H ( S ) .
It appears to be similarly obvious that H ( S ) 5 I(,Y;YlZ) = I ( S Z ; ' I " Z ) -
H ( Z ) because even under the assumpt,ion t,hat Alice and Bob could learn 2.
the remaining information sharrd by AIicp ant1 Bob is an tipper hound on the information they can share in secrecy. T h e following theorem, which is proved in [8] , summarizes these results.
Theorem 1. For e v e r y key a g r e e m e n t protocol satisfying (2)- (5),
H ( S ) 5 I(X: YJZ) + H(.SJS') + I ( S ; C'Z)
In particular,
H ( S ) 5 J(>Y; Y) + H ( S I S ' ) + rjs; C t )
The following corollary follows from Theorem 1, inequality (8) 
The Secret Key Rate
In order to be able to prow lower bounds on the achievable size, of a key shared by Alice and Bob in secrecy we nerd to make more specific assumptions about the distribution P x y z One natural asslimption is that the random experiment generating S Y Z is rrpeatcd many times independently: Alirp, Bob and
For such a scenario of independent, repetitions of a random experiment, which is well motivated by models such as discrete memoryless sources and cliannels previously considered in information theory, the quantity that appears to he of most interest from an information-theowtic point of view is defincd below.
Definition. The secre2 key rate 0f.Y a n d I ' with respecf lo 2, tlrnot.cd S(X; 17ilZ): is the maximum rate at which Alice and Bob can agree on a secret, key S while keeping the rate at which Eve obtains information arbitrarily small, i.e., it is the maximal R such that for every e > 0 there exists a protocol for sufficiently large N satisfying (2)- (6) 
*v --T(S;CtZN) 5 E ,
and achieving
Before deriving lower b o u n d s on S(X; Y l l Z )
we st,at,e the following t,heorern, which is an immediat,e consequence of Corollary 2. 
b y
The following t,heorem (cf. [PI for a proof) st,ates a nontrivial lower hoiind on the secret key rate. If it is either t h e case that Eve has less information about Y than Alice or, by symmetry, less information ahout S t,han Rob, then s u c h a difference of information can be exploited. is not tight in general as will be demonstrat,ed in t,he next sect,ion. In part,icular, the Iower bound of Theorem 4 is 0 for the situation described in the abstract of the paper. There exist protocols with several rounds of interaction between Alice and Bob which are superior to single-round protocols like the one used in the proof of Theorem 4 (cf. [el).
Binary Symmetric Random Variables
In this section the case of symmet,rically distributtd hinary random variables is considered. One way of generat,ing such a set S, I', Z is by generating a random bit R according to (9) P K ( 0 ) = P R ( 1 ) = 1/2 and "sending" I2 over three i n d e p e n d e n t hinary symmetric channels C. 4 random variables are st,atisticnlly independent, ran be generated according to (9) and (10) for some C A~C H and 6~.
As one realistic scenario where S. 1-and 2 w i t h probability tliqtrihution P~v z satisfying (11) are available for two parties and an enemy. consider a satellite broadcasting random bits at a very low signal-to-noise ratio siich that, even an enemy Eve with a rcreiving antenna that, is mucli 1 a r p r anct morc sophisticated than Alice's and Boh's antenna cannot receive t,he 1,its withollt error. Not,e t,hat f x y z sa.tiafies the given condition also whcn the channels CA! C g and CE are dependent, as one ~vould rcalistically have to assiirrie. Tile following theorem has been proved in [8] .
Theorem 5 . Let X y ; Y and Z be b i n n r y random rnrinb/e.s g e n e r a f e d according t o (9) and (10). Then
T h e lower bound of Theorem 5 vanishes unless either
i.e., unless either Alice's or Bob's channel is superior to Eve's channel. It is somewhat surprising that even when Eve's channel is milch more reliable that both Alice's and Bob's channel, secret key agreement. is possihle.
public channel, where .Yi is the ith random bit received by Alice and where addition is modulo 2, Alice can send the bit I$ over a conceptual broadcast channel to Bob and Eve such that Bob receives V , as if it. were sent, over a cascade of Alice's and Bob's channel (bit. error probability EA + E B -2 6 . 4~~) and
Eve receives 6 as if it were sent over a cascade of Alice's and Eve's channel (hit error probability E A + E E -FACE).
In order to share a secret key with Bob, Alice randomly selects a codeword V-v from the set of codewords of an appropriate error-correcting code C with codewords of length ili and sends it to Bob (and also to Eve) over the described conceptual broadcast channel. The key to achieving a positive secret key rate even if both E A > 6~ and C B > E E is for Bob to accept a received word only if he can make a very reliable decision about the codeword sent by Alice, i.e., if it is very close to some codeword of the code C, i.e., if the Hamming distance to a codeword is much smaller than the numher of errors correctable by an optimal decoder for the code. For each received block Bob announces over the public channel whether he accepts or rejects it.
The key observation in the above protocol is that although Eve receives codewords \'" more reliahly t,han Rot: on t h e average, her conceptual channel may nevertheless be worse (for appropriate choices of a code C and for an appropriak reliability decision) than Bob's channel, if one averages only over thosr instances accepted by Bob. Because consecutive uses of the channel are indcpcndt,nt,, the words discarded by Bob are also usplcss for Evr.
The special case of a repeat code was consitlrreti it1 [a] . Alice sentls each l i i t N times over the conceptual channel. and Bob accepts a received word if and only if all the bits are equal. Although this scheme demorist.rntrs that secret key agreement is possible even if > E E and E B > E E ! it is extremcl?; incficient when E E is considerably smaller t,han bot,h c-4 and 6~. The reaSon is that in order to arrive at a situation where Bob's channel is bet,ter than Eve's channel if averaged over those instances accepted by Bob. a large block length ,V must. be used in which case the probability t.hat no error occurs within a block and thus the block is accepted by Bob can be extremely small. It is one of the purposes of this paper to describe protocols that are much more efTicient t 8 h m the protocol discussed in [8] .
An important observation towards improving the key agreement, rate is that several rounds of a protocol as described above can be used by Alice and Rob t o continuously increase the reliability of the shared string at. t.he expense of shrinking it. In a first step, a.nd even in some subsequent steps, it is not, required that Bob knows Alice's bits more reliably than Eve; it is sufficient t h a t Eve's advantage is reduced in every step. Hence using several protocol s k p s w i t h short, blocks allows to achieve comparable bit error probabilities for the finally shared string as if a long rep& code were used. hut wit,h a much larger rate.
Consider as an example a simple J'V = :3 repeat code. Bob accepts a received block of length 3 if and only if all three bits agree, and announces which blocks he accepts. The probability of accepting a block-is 2 1/4; hence the strings held by Alice and Bob are shrunk by this step by at most a factor 12. Alice and Bob can use the same step on the resulting string repeatedly. each time decreasing its length by at most a factor 12 while increasing the bit agreement probability. It is straight-forward to verify that when k steps are used, Bob's and Eve's bit error probabilit,ies when guessing the bits of Alice's final string are precisely the same as if a repeat code of length Sk had been used in t.he above described basic protocol, but that the expected rate at which random secret key bits are extracted is e.uponeritmially larger iri the new protocol.
Example. Let C A = € 5 = 0.47 and let, Eve's channel be 100 times less noisy, i.e., have 100 times greater capacity.
we obtain E E = 0.2093. 1-1 repeat code of length 243 yields bit error probabilities 0.148 and 0.193 for Bob and Eve, but the probabi1it.y that a block is accept,ed by Rob is not significantly larger than TZ4'. On the other hand, 5 consecutive applications of the described step with a code of length 3 allow to achieve the snnir hit error probabilities, but, only an cxpectrcl n i i m h e r of at most. < 25O.nOn (actually much less) bits are required for generating one bit shared with the mentioned bit error probabilities.
Of course, additional protocol steps are required for exploiting tlic advantage over Eve achieved by this protocol and reducing the bit error probal)ility of the final shared string. For example. error correct.iiig codes can he used to remove the errors between Alice's and Bob's string, and universal hashing as described in [3] can be used to reduce Eve's information.
It should he point,ed out t,hat for given assumed ratios of the noise power on the three channels, the signal power is a free paramekr: thus 6.4 can he chosen arbitrarily. The larger € A , the smaller is the signal powPr and hence the larger can the satelite's bit transmission rate be chosen.
The use of repeat codes as described above, and rnore generally of linear error-correcting codes, is equivalent to the exchange of parity checks of t'he stored string over the public channel, without gemrating and encoding ra.ndom bits, and using as a new string some orthogonal parity checks. Reconciliation protocols based on the exchange of parity checks were also discussed in [2] . A further improvement over the basic use of repeat codes descrihed above is for Bob to also accept, instances for which a. decision ahout the bit, sent by Alice is less reliable than if !V idrntical bits were received. In such a scenario, Bob informs Alice (and Eve) ahorit the niiniber of errors lie has received in a block, assuming that his ma.jority decision is correct.
